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 Cosmopolitanism in an Age of Xenophobia and Ethnic conflicts 
Paul Bagguley and Yasmin Hussain 
Introduction 
In this chapter we evaluate the idea of cosmopolitanism in relation to some recent 
forces that appear to be reversing it in cases such as the UK in the forms of the return 
of nationalism, the rise of populism in the West (Ashbee, 2017), counter-terrorism 
discourse and practices, and increasing xenophobia, Islamophobia and racism. This 
is taking place in the context of increasing social inequalities (Picketty, 2014) and 
global economic and political competition between nations. We begin with a ǯ(2002) analysis of cosmopolitanism using this heuristically to 
assess recent developments in the UK in terms of three mom  Ǯ-ǯǤThey are all characterised to some degree by a form of populism, 
transformed public discourses and a shift in state institutions and practices. Each of 
these moments signalled an anti-cosmopolitan movement in different fields. Firstly, 
in terms of the field of internal relationships between ethnic groups within the UK 
and how these are managed by the state. For example tǯ
2001 ethnic riots in the UK (Bagguley and Hussain, 2008) was distinctly anti-
cosmopolitan, being focused upon encouraging the assimilation of British South 
Asians. Secondly, in terms of international relations and internal securitisation, the 
stateǯ responses to the 9/11 attacks on the USA, but especially the 7/7 terrorist 
attacks in London can only be read as being contrary to the process of 
cosmpolitanization identified by authors such as Beck (2006). Thirdly, and most      ǯ      (Clarke et al., 2017) 
popularly known as Brexit, also demonstrates both a popular and state level anti-
cosmopolitanism. 
 
Cosmopolitanism between normative political philosophy and sociological realism. 
Ulrich Beck stands as perhaps the most stridently optimistic social theorist in his 
view of the cosmopolitan present. The main thrust of his analysis was to take the 
idea of cosmopolitanism from the discourse of political theory towards a more 
sociological perspective. He argued that the idea of cosmopolitanism has: 
  ǥ  Ǥ
Indeed it has become the defining feature of a new era, the era of reflexive 
modernity, in which national borders aǥO?ǡ
2006: 2) 
He conceived of cosmopolitanism in terms of national differences, whilst others 
would relate it to imaginary racial differences, ethnicity or religion. Beck goes on to        Ǯǥ    ǥǯO?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ?O?ǤA key question for him 
whether cosmopolitanism may be able to Ǯ r modernities and 
civilisationsǯO?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?O?ǡf ǮǯǮǯǤ Furthermore, Beck suggests that cosmopolitan ideas have 
gathered support recently, because it is a reflection of cosmopolitan realities. This is 
related to his analysis of globalisation, which he sees occurring within nation-states, 
so that the resulting cosmopolitan social reality characterises ǯ 
experiences and daily life.      Ǯǯǡ          
(Bhambra, 2014: 73). For example Turner (2002: 52) notes that cosmopolitanism 
in practice is not the monopoly of the contemporary West and that trading centres 
in early Islam enabled peaceful encounters between ethnically, religiously and 
tribally diverse groups. Finally, ǯǡ
within that configuration the EU. 
Harrington (2016: 352) has also ǯ
argument whereby one has to accept the emergence of cosmopolitanism in order to 
be in a position to analyse and appreciate it. In addition Martell (2008: 131) has 
suggested that  Ǯǥ         Ǥǯ it may be argued 
that this is precisely what has happened in the first two decades of this century in 
certain Western countries such as the UK. What Beck refers to as anti-
cosmopolitanisation has become dominant, contrary to his rather dismissive view 
of it ǣǮǯO?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?O?ǮǯO?ǡ  ? ? ? ?ǣ  ? ? ?O?Ǥ He suggests that anti-cosmopolitanism can only Ǯ-ǡǯO?ǡ  ? ? ? ?ǣ  ? ? ?O?ǤThis 
 ǯ
anti-cosmopolitan developments that we discuss in this chapter. The Brexit vote in 
Britain may be seen as an attempt at the re-erection of old national boundaries in 
reality. Furthermore, Martell (2009) has pointed out Beck sees American military 
power as humanitarian and cosmopolitan, which in effect legitimates global ǯǤ It could also be 
suggested that it overlooks the crisis of US hegemony (Bergesen and Lizardo, 2004) 
and the how  Ǯ  ǯ    dominant discourse of 
contemporary international politics as understood from the perspective of the West 
(Sayyid, 2013). 
There are grounds for thinking of cosmopolitanism as being the cultural, 
philosophical and social mirror of global capitalism. Within this perspective the 
middle classes are seen by some as the strategic cosmopolitans of contemporary ǣǮ(ǥ) a nodal agent in the expanding networks of the global 
economy. He or she is the new, superior foǯ (Mitchell, 
2003: 400). However, as Harrington (2016: 352-3) has noted increased global 
mobility need not produce greater global sensitivity. Szerzynski and Urry (2002) 
see the spread of cosmopolitanism as the localised effects of globalisation, and they 
give a central role ǮǯǤǮǯO?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?O?ǡ
write of a Ǯǯcosmopolitan individual who is characterised by extensive 
mobility, consumption of diverse places, curiosity of different peoples and places, 
risk taking in encounters with others, being able to make aesthetic judgements 
about different places, possessing semiotic skills of interpretation together with an 
openness to other peoples and their cultures (Szerzynski and Urry, 2002: 470). 
Contrary to this analysis it can be suggested that the past twenty years have seen a 
reversal of this trend at multiple levels in the UK in terms of state practices towards, ǮǯǤ 
More recently there has been a resurgence of studies of everyday 
cosmopolitanism, whilst often critical of the prescriptive moral character of 
cosmopolitanism as political philosophy, it may be argued that they still retain a 
certain degree of optimism. This is despite often noting the racist or othering friction 
 that sometimes occurs in cosmopolitan encounters in the UK for example 
(Andreouli and Howarth, 2018: 14; Neal et al., 2018: 27; Hall, 2012: 67-8). We feel 
that this approach overlooks or down play three important issues. Firstly, as studies 
of micro interactions between relatively powerless groups they do not fully take 
account of the wider structural context of racism. Secondly they fail to consider the 
possibility of what Houts-Picca and Feagin (2007) in a US context have theorised as Ǯ-ǯǤ
interactions may be Ǯ-ǯ in public settings, whilst in a Ǯback 
stageǯ context where only White people are present racism may re-
emerge. Thirdly the ways in which public events give rise to many micro events of 
racist hostility, and we shall discuss an example of this in thǯ
to leave the EU as discussed below. If we were truly on the path towards a 
cosmopolitan utopia as implied by some such as Beck (2006) then such events 
would be less likely, or least managed more effectively, by social and political elites.  
 
Three instances of anti-cosmopolitanism in the UK 
This section examines three instances of anti-cosmopolitanism in the UK. The first 
of these are the ethnic riots in the North of England in the summer of 2001 (Bagguley 
and Hussain, 2008). It then moves on to examine how responses to terrorist attacks 
in the UK and the Brexit vote may be seen as instances of anti-cosmopolitanism. 
The spring and summer of 2001 was marked in the UK by a series of riots in 
the North of England in Oldham on 26-29 May, Burnley on 24-26 June and most 
seriously in Bradford on 7-9 July (Bagguley and Hussain, 2008). In response the 
government commissioned a report that became known as the Cantle report on ǮǯO?ǡ  ? ? ? ?O?Ǥ striking about the Cantle report is 
how strongly anti-cosmopolitan its arguments were, and how its central ideas and Ǯǯ
discourse and policy making in the UK around matters of ethnic identity and racism. 
The idea of community cohesion was closely linked to the influence of 
communitarian thinking on the Labour governments of Tony Blair (Bagguley and 
Hussain, 2008).  
 The Cantle report represented South Asian Muslim communities as self-
segregating Ȃ not just geographically, but also socially and culturally. It saw South 
Asian Muslim communities in the North of England as in a state of self-generated 
crisis. They were seen as reproducing Ǯǯas not speaking 
English at home, organising arranged marriages, and involved in intergenerational 
conflict. Muslim communities were to be Ǯ  ǯ under the Cantle ǯO?ǡ ? ? ? O?. The Cantle report and the 
subsequent translation of its ideas into local policies of community cohesion 
represent a clear example of anti-cosmopolitanism as a state practice. 
 
The 9/11 attacks on the USA, the 7/7 bombings in London and other 
attempted terrorist attacks have occurred at the height of academic debates around 
cosmopolitanism. Popular reactions to terrorist attacks, public discourse and state 
policies are all aspects of the process of securitisation of British Muslims (Hussain 
and Bagguley, 2012). All of these aspects of securitisation can be seen as anti-
cosmopolitan. Securitisation is the process by which an issue or group defined as a 
security threat, so that governmental and societal resources are mobilised to 
counter it. Through this process political leaders build public support Ȃ through 
political statements and the media - for exceptional and new legislation and state 
initiatives to counter the threat. Ǯǯecomes the Ǯǯ
in political debate, the media and amongst the public. It becomes impossible to 
speak of that group without implying their Ǯthreatǯ to security. (Buzan et al., 1998). 
In the UK the Terrorism Act Ȃ 2000 the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act Ȃ 
2001 are examples of the exceptional powers taken on by the state as part of this 
process. These entail additional powers to police Ȃ search, arrest and detain. In 
practice these powers are applied in excess to the issues that they ostensibly 
address as illustrated by the fact that 1228 people arrested under anti-terrorism 
legislation between Sept 2001 and March 2007. Only 41 or under 4% of those 
arrested were convicted of a terrorist offence. (Hewitt, 2007) 
Even prior to 9/11 the main themes of news coverage of Muslims in the UK 
were overwhelmingly negative. Muslims have for several decades now been 
represented as a threat to UK security because they are involved in deviant activities 
 of various kinds. Muslims are perceived as a threat to British values and therefore a 
threat to social integration. It is widely assumed that there are inherent cultural 
differences between Muslims and the British which creates interpersonal tensions. 
At the same time Muslims are seen to be increasingly agitating for their interests in 
politics, education and against discrimination (Poole, 2006). 
Similar negative themes have continued in media reporting, but are now     ǣ Ǯ ǯ O?ǡ  ? ? ? ?O?Ǥ is 
presented as anti-modern, politically unstable, undemocratic, barbaric and chaotic. 
The representation of Muslims in the UK is dominated by this framework (Nickels 
et al., 2010). They are seen by journalists as threats to British values, alongside 
ambiguous representations of Muslims as either moderate or extremist. Moderate 
Muslims seen as have a responsibility for bringing the extremists under control- ǮǯǤ The securitisation of everyday encounters (Hussain and 
Bagguley, 2013) has meant that individual and collective experiences of verbal 
abuse and physical attacks on Muslims have increased after terrorist attacks. Certain 
symbols seem to provoke such reactions, such as the carrying of a backpack, or 
wearing clothing perceived as Islamic. Airports are routinely identified by British 
Muslims as the locations of humiliating encounters with authority. What exactly is 
humiliating about such experiences is the denial of taken-for-granted national 
identity, and the cǮǯȂ many were lawful, highly educated 
and middle class Ȃ that these practices entail. Muslim identity is routinely seen as 
threatening by UK Airport authorities. Furthermore, markers of religious purity, e.g. ǯ ǡ are treated as signs of danger, as a reason to be suspicious 
(Blackwood et al., 2013). Ǯǯ strategy developed since the 2005 terrorist attacks on London 
seeks to challenge the ideology behind terrorism. It aims to disrupt those who 
promote terrorism, whilst supporting those who are seen as vulnerable to 
recruitment into terrorism. One of its main goals is to increase the resilience of 
communities to terrorism, however, the focus is almost entirely upon Muslim 
communities. The Prevent strategy is delivered locally through local councils and 
the police, schools, universities and the health service, where front-line teachers, 
 health and social care workers are given short training courses on how to recognise 
the signs of terrorism amongst their clients. 
Section 44 of the Terrorism Act allowed Police to stop and search anyone 
anywhere anytime without reasonable grounds for suspicion that they were 
engaged in terrorist or terrorist related activities. In 2009 more than 100,000 
section 44 searches were carried out but none resulted in an arrest for a terrorism 
related offence. A few hundred people given warnings about alcohol use and 
possession of cannabis, so that it is evident that the legislation was being used to 
police petty crime. Evidence suggests that the legislation was disproportionately 
used against those of South Asian or Other ethnic origin. Interviews with those 
stopped and searched revealed that felt they were   Ǯ 
Aǡ ǯǡnlike White people who were stopped (Parmar, 
2011). What this also signifies is a breakdown of the boundary between counter-
terrorism policing and ordinary policing. Further interviews with the police    ǣ Ǯǯ      ǥǯ   ? ?
searches had the effeǮǯ (Parmar, 2011). This example of 
policing to reassure the public is a good example of securitisation. However, the 
overall response to terrorism may be seen to exemplify anti-cosmopolitan 
tendencies. Rather than the features of cosmopolitanism identified by Beck (2006) 
such as openness and tolerance of national and ethnic differences, these very 
differences have becomes signs of a threat to a Britishness which is understood in ǮǯǤ 
The final example of an instance of anti-cosmopolitanism that is discussed 
here concerns the vote in the UK in a referendum to leave the EU Ȃ popularly known 
as the Brexit vote. Firstly the principal features of the leave campaign and how it 
was suffused with anti-cosmopolitan themes are outlined. Then the discussion 
moves on to consider the wave of racist attacks that occurred immediately after the 
vote to leave the EU. This wave of attacks is conceptualised as a form of ǮǯǤ  Ǯ ǯ   a form racist behaviour performed in      Ǯǯ  ǮǯǤ      
audiences of other White British people friends or even strangers. It reinforces a       Ǯǯ   Ǯǯ  
 minorities. This was especially important in the context of the Brexit campaign. It 
often          Ǯ ǯ 
behaviour in public had been removed, so that racist performances that be normally   Ǯǯ         Ǥ What was 
previously expresse  Ǯ-ǯ   Ǯ-ǯ  
public audience. 
Central to understanding how this celebratory racism suddenly emerged 
after the Brexit vote is the how far immigration was the central issue underlying the 
campaign for Britain to leave the EU. Rather than the actual numbers and character           ǡ    ǯ
concerns with immigration generated a series of myths about the numbers and 
categories of migrants that principally constructed the public response (Favell and 
Barbulescu, 2018). More generally it has been suggested that the Brexit vote 
reflected long term deep seated racism across the UK population and not just ǮǯO?
ǡ ? ? ? ?O?Ǥ  
The broader politics of Brexit was also a reflection of a divided ruling elite, 
especially within the ruling Conservative Party; a crisis of the party system within 
both major parties, but especially the Conservatives, who feared losing support to 
the anti-European UK Independence Party; and a crisis of legitimacy of the dominant 
neo-liberal strategies for the country (Jessop, 2017: 134). The result was the cross-
class character of the support for leaving the EU in the referendum of 2016. Whilst 
two thirds of the traditionally defined manual working class voted in favour of 
leaving the EU this made up only 24 per cent of the overall vote in favour of leaving. 
Most of the vote in favour of leaving the EU came from the middle classes (Antonucci 
et al., 2017), and the South of England (Dorling, 2016). Furthermore, 66 per cent of 
those aged 66 and over voted in favour of leaveǡ ? ?Ǯǯ ? ?O?
et al., 2017: 155). Rather the leave vote was a cross-class coalition of older and 
middle sections of the population. This was mobilised partly in terms of a nostalgia 
for the British Empire, but also in terms of a British isolationism. The first of these 
was connected to the idea of returning democratic control of the country to the UK 
so that it could re-establish trading relations with the former empire. After the 
 Brexit vote this economic strategy was referred to by UK government officials as Ǯ  ?Ǥ ?ǯ O?  
ǡ  ? ? ? ?ǣ  ? ? ? ?O?Ǥ    
melancholia (Gilroy, 2004) rooted in the loss of empire and ǯ
former imperial prestige, and in part explains the support for the leave campaign 
amongst the older sections of the population. The second aspect revolves around 
the longer run constructions of the migrant as an economic threat (Virdee and 
McGeever, 2018: 1806) Ǯǯ, as well as Muslims 
constructed as a security threat to the British nation (Hussain and Bagguley, 2012). 
This interpretation is also confirmed by statistical analyses of surveys after the vote 
which showed that concerns about controlling the economy, immigration and 
terrorism were strongly associated with voting leave, and that these were views 
solidly in place before the referendum (Clarke et al., 2017: 161). 
The outpouring of interpersonal racism immediately after the vote to leave 
was announced was just as shocking and surprising as the leave vote itself. This 
involved not just verbal racism, but physical attacks on people and property. The 
number of hate crimes recorded for the last two weeks in June increased by 42 per 
cent compared to last year.  A total of 3,076 incidents were recorded across the 
country between 16 and 30 June Ȃcompared to the 915 reports recorded over the 
same period in 2015 
(https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/29/frenzy-hatred-brexit-
racism-abuse-referendum-celebratory-lasting-damage). Celebratory racism Ǯǯǡly. It reflected the enduring nature 
of racism as a macro phenomenon, alongside the rǮǯǮ-ǯǤThe rǮǯ
had effectively legitimated public expressions of racism resulting in its 
normalisation. What was also striking was the generic character of Brexit 
celebratory racism: all visible ethnic minorities were targeted not just Europeans. 
All ethnic and racialized minorities became represented during the Brexit campaign Ǯǯ lonǮǯwere ǮǯǤThese ǮǯǮǯǮǯǤ
They were performed for public audiences of other White British people be they 
friends or strangers. They had the effect of reinforcing a sense of White British   Ǯǯ   Ǯǯ  Ǯǯ racialised minorities. 
 These performances emerged from the f  Ǯ ǯ 
behaviour in public had been removed by the Brexit campaign. Although racist 
incidents were experienced before the Brexit votes by recent migrants to the UK 
(Rzepnikowska, 2018), what was new after the Brexit vote was both their scale and 
scope, and the ways in which they reflected the dominant discourse of the leave 
campaign (Burnett, 2016). 
Conclusion: after the cosmopolitan revolution just racism as usual? 
Beck described the resurgence of interest in cosmopolitanism almost two decades ǮǯO? ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?O?Ǥ
is increased is not so much the increased cosmopolitanisation (Beck, 2002: 17) that 
he predicted, but increased resistance to these processes. In the case of the UK this 
will see epoch making structural economic, political and social changes in its 
relationship with Europe. ǯ
Brexit vote and the wider global context of increasing populism, nationalism and 
xenophobia as a situation which was already cosmopolitan but that popular was ǣǮǯO?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ?O?Ǥ  ǯ        a more 
nation-state bound past, and were no longer congruent with a more globalised 
present. In one of his final books he developed the concept of retrotopia as a form of 
nostalgia that reconciled security and freedom based on a highly selective memory 
of the past (Bauman, 2017). The past of the UK and Europe was of course always 
global to some degree marked by colonialism, imperialism, migration and trade, but 
that is not how most people remember it. The past that people recall is more nation-
state bound and ethnically homogenous, and is captured by how Bauman conceives ǣǮ(ǥ) ǡǥ  how nice it was to 
live in the past, how much better there were the ways of life which our parents, or ǡǤǯO?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ?O?Ǥ
case of the leave campaign for Brexit but also in the case of the other examples that 
we have discussed here, the motivations and processes involved exemplify a 
particular form of retrotopia. Rather than living in an age of cosmopolitanism as 
 conceptualised by Beck, we live in an age of retrotopia that has emerged as a form 
of reaction against the forces of cosmopolitanisation. 
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